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NOTES 
From Feres to Stencel:· Should Military Personnel 
Have Access to FTCA Recovery? 
Only four years after the Federal Tort Claims Act of 19461 
stripped away the obsolete and inequitable sovereign immunity2 
of the United States government, the Supreme Court held that 
the United States could not be sued on tort claims growing out 
of military service. This decision in Feres v. United States3 cre-
ated a major exception to the FTCA and plunged a large class of 
potential claimants back into the era of sovereign infallibility.4 
Feres, however, ha_s failed to prevent FTCA claims based on the 
injury or death of military personnel. 5 The Feres rule has aroused 
conflicting lines of interpretation;6 courts have sought to limit the 
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 
2412(c), 2671-2680 (1976). 
2. The growth of the concept of sovereign immunity from Anglo-Saxon law to the 
FTCA is traced in Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 30 NACCA L.J. 404, 
406-09 (1963). A history of acts preceding the FTCA and earlier congressional attempts 
to enact a general waiver of immunity may be found in Wright, Growth of the Ji"J'CA, 24 
JAG J. 151, 151-52 (1970). 
One major aim of the Act was to relieve persons injured by government negligence of 
an inequitable burden: 
Congress was aware that when losses caused by [governmentalj negligence are 
charged against the public treasury they are in effect spread among all those who 
contribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden 
on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured 
party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and appar-
ently did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from 
the services performed by Government employees. 
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957). 
3. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). In Feres, suit was brought under the FTCA for the wrongful 
death of a serviceman who was killed when the barrack in which he was sleeping was 
destroyed by fire. Government negligence was alleged in the maintenance of the heating 
system. Two cases consolidated with Feres, Jefferson v. United States and United States 
v. Griggs, alleged injury or death of servicemen due to negligent medical treatment by 
United States Army physicians. In each of these cases, the Court refused to "impute to 
Congress such a radical departure from established law" in enacting the FTCA as the 
creation of a cause of action against the Government for service-connected injury or death 
of a member of the armed forces. 340 U.S. at 146. 
4. The concept of sovereign immunity evolved from the common law doctrine that 
the king could do no wrong. Pound, supra note 2, at 406. 
5. See note 119 infra. . 
6. Some courts have applied an absolutist rule, whereby a claim is barred where the 
serviceman would not have been injured but for the fact that he was on active duty, see, 
e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Henninger v. United States, 
473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973), while others have defined 
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rule to avoid its inequity;7 and commentators have criticized it 
harshly.8 Nevertheless, two years ago the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed Feres in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States. u 
Stencel offered the Court an opportunity to view the issues 
with an informed eye, after thirty years of experience with the 
FrCA, a quarter century of litigation over the Feres rule, and a 
period of significant growth and change in judicial policy regard-
ing the power of the armed services over their personnel.JU Never-
"incident to service" as depending on whether the serviceman was on• or off-base at the 
time of injury, see, e.g., Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1954); Chambers v. 
United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966). See generally, Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 
24 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (1973); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, A.F. 
L. REV., Spring, 1976 at 24; Note, Military Rights Under the FTCA, 43 ST. JottN's L. REV. 
455 (1969). 
7. A few lower courts have attempted to redefine and narrow the "incident to service" 
test by employing certain aspects of the government-soldier relationship to formulate new 
tests for the allowability of an FTCA claim. For example, in Downes v. United States, 
249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965), it was suggested that the real question in applying Peres 
is "[w]as plaintiff performing duties of such a character as to undermine traditional 
concepts of military discipline if he were permitted to maintain a civil suit for injuries 
therefrom?" 249 F. Supp. at 628-29. Under this test the claim was not barred because 
plaintiff, a serviceman, was struck and injured by a military vehicle while leaving his base 
on a pass, "at his liberty to pursue his personal affairs as he saw fit at the moment of 
collision." 249 F. Supp. at 628-29. 
Another formulation was attempted in Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. 
Cal. 1966), a wrongful death action brought on behalf of two active duty servicemen who 
were passengers on an Air Force transport,plane which crashed due to alleged negligence 
of the Federal Aviation Agency. The court reasoned that the proper test is not whether 
the claimant was on or off duty, but whether the injury "stemmed from activities that 
involved an official military relationship between the negligent person and the claimant." 
261 F. Supp. at 256. Thus, although the deaths were actually "incident to service," the 
policies underlying Feres did not require dismissal of the claims. Such a test would permit 
a broad range of claims excluded under the strict "incident to service" rule, while protect-
ing the authority of those in command or those responsible for military decisions. 
In Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969), the court criticized the vague• 
ness of the Feres standard and held the proper test to be whether the injury "arose out of 
or in the course of military duty." 416 F.2d at 360. In Schwager v. United States, 279 I•'. 
Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the court suggested "an analysis of the relevant links between 
the 'activity' and the service." 279 F. Supp. at 263. 
8. See e.g., Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 316 (1954); Rhodes, supra note 6; Note, Federal Liability to Personnel of the 
Armed Forces, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90 (1951); Note, supra note 6. 
9. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
10. The case involved injuries suffered by Captain John Donham of the Missouri Air 
National Guard when he was forced to eject in flight from his jet and the egress life• 
support system malfunctioned. Permanently disabled, Donham sued both Stencel, manu-
facturer of the system, and the United States. Stencel cross-claimed against the United 
States for indemnity. The district court dismissed both claims against the United States 
on the basis of the Feres rule. Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo.1975). 
Although Donham did not appeal his case, the Eighth Circuit reviewed Stencel's appeal 
and upheld it. Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court 
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theless, the Court decided against Stencel's claim for indemnity 
from the federal government, upholding Feres and even extending 
it to bar third-party claims for indemnity for damages paid to 
cover service-connected injuries. 
This Note reevaluates the Feres doctrine in light of legal 
developments of the past three decades. It concludes that the 
FTCA should be extended to military claims. It discusses the 
arguments that military claims will burden vital government 
functions and shows that the exception11 to liability under the 
present FTCA, particularly the exception for "discretionary ac-
tions" by government employees, 12 would adequately protect all 
legitimate military interests. 
The Feres Court raised four pillars to support its decision, 
and later cases have elaborated upon that same structure. The 
first pillar is the Court's construction of the statutory language 
concerning a "parallel private liability." Although this theory 
held sway for several years, it has since_ been discarded. The 
second pillar is the argument that Congress would not have in-
tended to include military personnel within the FTCA's coverage, 
given the preexisting statutory compensation system for members 
of the armed services. This Note shows first that the progressively 
liberal construction of legislative intent behind the FTCA is in-
consistent with the judicially created exception and second that 
the statutory compensation system relied upon by the Feres 
Court is neither sufficiently reliable nor sufficiently exclusive to 
justify denying recovery under the FTCA. The third pillar is the 
tradition of judicial deference to military autonomy in the treat-
ment of personnel. But" th~ past three decades have seen that 
deference diminish steadily. Moreover, the FTCA exception of 
discretionary actions from liability, as construed and applied by 
the courts, would adequately protect the military need for auton-
omy and for discipline over personnel. The fourth pillar of Feres 
is judicial concern that application of local tort law under the 
affirmed. Stencel Aero Engr. Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) provides express exceptions to the Act. See note 111 infra. 
12. The full language of the exception is as follows: 
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, 
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved 
be abused. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See text at notes 129-33 infra. 
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FTCA13 would interfere with the uniform conduct of military ac-
tivities by imposing standards of care that varied from state to 
state. This Note contends that the "discretionary function" ex-
ception of the Act would sufficiently protect uniformity in mili-
tary activities. , 
The Feres exemption to the FTCA is unnecessary. It deprives 
military personnel of redress for harms in the name of policies 
that are more than adequately fulfilled by the FTCA's "dis-
cretionary function" exception. This Note concludes by pro-
posing a set of standards to guide the application of the discre-
tionary function exception and to ensure that it provides immun-
ity where waiver of sovereign immunity would endanger legiti-
mate military interests. Legislative or judicial abandonment of 
Feres in favor of principled application of the "discretionary func-
tion" exception and the other express exceptions to the FTCA 
would bring justice to our servicemen without jeopardizing na-
tional security. 
I. THE FTCA: JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE "PRIVATE PERSON" 
LANGUAGE 
Feres was one of a wave of cases in which the Supreme Court 
sought to divine the purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 
194614 and to delineate the scope of the waiver of immunity. Al-
though in other cases the Court urged liberal construction of the 
Act, 15 in Feres it took a cautious approach, establishing what is 
in fact the only judicially created exception to the Act. 16 In so 
doing, it relied on what may be termed "a parallel private liabil-
ity" theory-a theory arguing that the FTCA applies only where 
a parallel private liability for the tortious conduct exists in state 
law. 
The Court found its parallel private liability rule in the lan-
guage of the FTCA, which makes the government liable for claims 
13. Under the Act, liability is to be determined "in accordance with the law of the 
place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See also text at 
notes 112-21 •infra. 
14. The Act grants the federal courts jurisdiction over claims for injury, loss, or death, 
caused by the negligept or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstan-
ces where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurted. 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543,550 (1951); United States 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949). 
16. See note 11 supra for the legislatively created exceptions. 
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arising "under circumstances where the United States, if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant."17 The Court con-
strued that language to exclude military claims. Justice Jackson 
declared that "one obvious shortcoming" of Feres was that the 
plaintiff could show no liability of a private individual analogous 
to her claims. Even if the type of tortious act were one for which 
a private individual might be liable, the Court felt it must con-
sider "all the circumstances" of the claim, including the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and defendant. The Court found no 
analogous liability under the law of landlord and tenant, medical 
malpractice, or other types of tort, because of the unique status 
of the parties: no private individual had the power to raise an 
army and no member of a state militia had ever been permitted 
to sue a state.18 According to Justice Jackson, that unique rela-
tionship was determinative, for "[T]he act created no new 
causes of action, " 19 and its effect "was not to visit the government 
with novel and unprecedented liabilities.'.'20 
That rule against "novel and unprecedented liabilities" sig-
nificantly limited the effect of the FTCA by preserving federal 
immunity for any government activity that lacked a parallel or 
analogy in the private sector.21 But later decisions by the Court 
undermined the parallel liability test and finally eliminated it 
altogether. In 1955, the Court held in Indian Towing Co. v. 
United States22 that the United States could be held liable for the 
Coast Guard's negligent failure to repair a lighthouse. The Court, 
urging liberal construction of the Act, concluded that no parallel 
private liability need be shown for an FTCA claim to stand. 23 
Indian Towing was soon followed by Rayonier, Inc. v. United 
States, ~4 in which government firefighters negligently allowed the 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). 
18. 340 U.S. at 141-42. 
19. 340 U.S. at 141. 
20. 340 U.S. at 142. 
21. That reasoning played a significant part in the Court's decision against federal 
liability in the controversial case of Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). The 
case involved claims for death caused by the explosion of a government shipment of 
fertilizer. The alleged failure of the Coast Guard in fighting the fire which resulted from 
the explosion was held to fall outside the ITCA because of the lack of analogous private 
liability in tort law. 346 U.S. at 43-44. Justice Reed, writing for the majority, explained, 
"To impose liability for the alleged nonfeasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding 
the United States liable in tort for failure to impose a quarantine for, let us say, an 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease." 346 U.S. at 44. 
22. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 
23. 350 U.S. at 64-65. 
24. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). 
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plaintiff's building to burn down. In Rayonier the Court specifi-
cally refuted the "private liability" defense raised by the Govern-
ment as a misinterpretation of the purpose of the FTCA. 25 
Since Rayonier, courts have generally accepted that the 
FTCA does extend to "novel and unprecedented forms of liabil-
ity, " 26 and that the Feres rule barring claims where no analogous 
private liability can be shown is no longer good law.27 Many 
uniquely governmental activities have given rise to liability under 
the FTCA.28 The growth away from the "analogous private liabil-
ity" limitation on the scope of the FTCA is consistent with both 
the purposes of the Act and the general trend toward expanding 
governmental liability. 
Thus, whatever the stability of this first pillar in 1950, it does 
not have the strength in 1979 to support the broad Feres excep-
tion. An explanation for the exception's continuing vitality must 
stand on one of the other three columns. 
II. LEGISLATIVE lNTENT AND THE VETERANS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
The second pillar of Feres was the Court's contention that 
Congress could not have intended the FTCA to apply to military 
personnel because it had already created the veterans' compensa-
tion program _: "[providing] systems of simple, certain, and 
uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed ser-
vices. "29 The Court described this conclusion as the product of 
an attempt "to fit [the FTCA] into the entire statutory system 
to make a workable, consistent, and equitable whole,"30 and 
25. 352 U.S. at 319. 
26. E.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Lee v. United States, 261 1'', 
Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966). See Note, supra note 6, at 462-63. In Stencel Aero Engr. Corp. 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), the Court referred to the lack of analogous private 
liability as only a "surface anomaly." 431 U.S. at 671. 
27. See Note, supra note 6, at 468 n.64. 
28. E.g., the ITCA has been held to allow government liability for the negligence of 
an FBI agent in trying to capture the hijacker of a private airplane, Downs v. United 
States, 52~F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975), for damage to livestock resulting from failure to warn 
owners of land adjacent to nuclear testing grounds of nuclear tests, Bulloch v, United 
States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955), for negligent operation of airport control towers 
at municipal airports, Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967); United Air 
Lines Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), for 
negligent treatment of federal prisoners, United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); 
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), and for negligence of the Coast Guard in 
rescuing a privately owned ship, United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 
189 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967). 
29. 340 U.S. at 144. 
30. 340 U.S. at 139. 
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Chief Justice Burger explicitly reaffirmed it in Stencel. 31 The 
conclusion flows from the interplay of two intermediate assump-
tions-that Congress truly wanted to deny this remedy to mem-
bers of the military and that the veterans' compensation program 
is indeed adequate. Yet these assumptions are not entirely sound: 
congressional intent is at best ambiguous, and the compensation 
system is often inadequate. Moreover, they conflict with the 
Court's interpretation in other cases of veterans' benefits as 
nonexclusive. 
The Court began its discussion in Feres with a search for 
evidence of legislative intent relating to the rights of military 
personnel under the FTCA.32 Unfortunately, the congressional 
debates contain no language on which to base a general rule for 
military claims, 33 and the Court was thus left to make inferences 
from the broader statutory structure. The Act specifically ex-
cludes claims arising from combat and claims arising in a foreign 
country, 34 but it has no general provision relating to its effect on 
members of the armed forces.35 The Feres claimants had argued 
from this structure that Congress intended no general exclusion 
of military personnel38-why bother to make specific exclusions if 
there exists a general exclusion that subsumes them? Moreover, 
the FTCA includes "military personnel" in its definition of gov-
ernment employee. The Court, however, found more persuasive 
the argument that congressional silence grew out of an under-
standing that the existing veterans' compensation system was the 
exclusive remedy: "Congress was suffering from no plague of pri-
vate bills on the behalf of military and naval personnel, because 
a comprehensive system of relief had been authorized for them 
and their dependents by statute. " 37 
31. 431 U.S. at 672-73. 
32. 340 U.S. at 138. 
33. 340 U.S. at 138. 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), (k) (1976). 
35. 340 U.S. at 144. 
36. 340 U.S. at 138-39. 
37. 340 U.S. at 140. Before the enactment of the Fl'CA, the only recourse for a citizen 
injured by the negligence of a government employee was to petition Congress to pass a 
private bill providing a special grant of relief. This system of relief proved unwieldy and 
inadequate as the range of government activities expanded, bringing a correspondingly 
steady increase in the number of private bills brought before Congress. The legislative 
history indicates that the primary aims of the Fl'CA were to provide those injured by 
government activities with a fair and accessible forum in the federal court system, and to 
relieve Congress of the burden of considering the thousands of private relief bills brought 
before it yearly. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946). See also 340 U.S. at 
139-40. 
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Both logic and history reveal significant weaknesses in that 
argument. In his Stencel dissent, Justice Marshall showed that 
congressional silence supports the inference of nonexclusivity at 
least as well as that of exclusivity.38 Before enacting the FTCA, 
the federal government had adopted a compensation plan for 
civilian employees, the Federal Employees Compensation Act 
(FECA),39 that contained an express exclusion of other govern-
ment liability.40 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court interpreted con-
gressional silence in the FTCA to override that express exclusion 
and to offer further compensation to "unrelated third parties."41 
The present Veterans' Benefits Act42 and its predecessors43 con-
tain no such express exclusion, and yet the Feres Court found one 
for veterans and the Stencel Court found one for unrelated third 
parties. It is somewhat anomalous to think that Congress wanted 
to use the FTCA to override express exclusions but not to override 
implied ones. Furthermore, this view is inconsistent with the pro-
gressively liberal posture that the Court has taken in interpreting 
the FTCA in other contexts. In 1957 the Court declared, "There 
is no .justification for this Court to read exceptions into the Act 
beyond those provided for by Congress. " 44 
The second assumption underlying the Feres conclusion that 
Congress did not have military personnel in mind when it passed 
the FTCA is that the veterans' compensation system offers a 
"simple, certain, and uniform"45 substitute for FTCA recovery. 
The Feres Court compared the veterans' compensation program 
to workers' compensation plans, which generally replace the com-
mon law tort remedy with a certain statutory award.46 That com-
parison, however, is misleading. The certainty of workers com-
pensation justifies the exclusion of the tort remedy.47 But veter-
38. 431 U.S. at 675-76. 
39. 5 u.s.c. §§ 8101-8151 (1976). 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976). 
41. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 601 (1963). 
42. 38 u.s.c. §§ 321-362 (1976). 
43. At the time of Feres, the laws relating to compensation and pensions for the 
veterans of the various wars constituted Title 38 of the United States Code. In 1958, 
Congress enacted the Veterans' Benefit Act, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 1, 72 Stat. 1105, a 
complete revision and consolidation of those laws. 
44. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957). 
45. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). 
46. E.g., CAL. LAB. ConE § 3601 (Deering 1976); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, § 418.863 
(West Supp. 1979); N.Y. WoRK. CoMP. LAW § 26 (McKinney Supp. 1978); 5 U.S.C. § 8102 
(1976). 
47. E.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1916); Jensen v. 
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ans' compensation is not certain enough-and was not certain 
enough at the time of Feres-to justify depriving a serviceperson 
of the option of a tort claim. 
Veterans' compensation is uncertain because it is condi-
tional-subordinate to the disciplinary needs of the armed forces. 
Unlike a workers' compensation award, which is a vested right 
and revocable only when the beneficiary's earning power has 
changed, 48 a veterans' award is merely a conditional gift. Justice 
Sutherland described veterans' compensation as "a mere gratuity 
for which no suit can be maintained."49 This is because the sys-
tem is one of governmental largesse: "The underlying principle 
of pension and compensation is based upon the desire of a grate-
ful Government to supplement the earning capacity of the vet-
eran in civilian life proportionate to the degree of his disability 
which has directly diminished that capacity."50 
Because it is "gratuitous," a valid award of veterans' com-
pensation may be forfeited temporarily or permanently for a 
number of reasons unrelated to earning ability. For example, a 
veteran forfeits his compensation temporarily during imprison-
ment for a felony or misdemeanqr51 and forfeits it permanently 
upon conviction for treason, sabotage, 52 or "subversive activi-
ties."53 Moreover, a veteran or his dependent will not receive a 
pension or compensation unless the period of service on which the 
claim is based was terminated by "discharge or release under 
conditions other than dishonorable. " 54 This provision bars bene-
fits if the member of the military is discharged as a conscientious 
Southern Pac. Co., 2l5 N.Y. 514, 526-28, 109 N.E. 600, 603-04 (1915), revd. on other 
grounds, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See also 81 AM. JUR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 21 
(1976). 
48. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5806 (Deering 1976); M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.863 
(West Supp. 1979); N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAw § 26 (McKinney Supp. 1978). 5 U.S.C. § 8102 
(1976). Regarding workers' compensation, see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE§ 5903 (Deering 1976); 
M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 418.351, .353, .357, .361 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. WORK. CoMP. 
LAW §§ 15 (6-a), 22 (McKinney 1965). FECA only provides for the reduction of compensa-
tion in case of changes affecting the degree of disability and wage-earning power, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 8113 (1976), or of recovery from a third person, § 8132. 
49. Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924). 
50. H.R. REP. No. 2301, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946). The concept of compensation 
as a mere gratuity is obsolete, especially with the introduction of the volunteer army. 
Instead, whatever the scope of compensation, awards should be restructured on the work-
ers' compensation model and made independent of·military disciplinary policies. 
51. 38 U.S.C. § 505(a) (1976). 
52. 38 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1976). 
53. 38 u.s.c. § 3505 (1976). 
54. 38 u.s.c. §§ 310, 331 (1976). 
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objector,55 for an offense involving moral turpitude,56 or for 
"generally, homosexual acts."57 
Thus, as it stands now, the Veterans' Benefits Act does ,not 
provide certain recovery for service-connected injuries. In assert-
ing tha'i the veterans' compensation system provides protection 
to veterans and their families analogous to the protection of work-
ers' compensation statutes, the Court has skimmed over crucial 
differences in the nature and realities of the two systems. The 
veterans' program may be appropriate where the rationale for 
compensation is merely governmental largesse, but it is no substi-
tute for congressionally mandated tort recovery. 
In Stencel, the Court noted that one purpose of the veterans' 
compensation scheme was to place an "upper limit" on govern-
ment liability.58 The Feres rule, however, admits an area where 
both the statutory and the tort remedies are available, and thus 
there is no statutory "upper limit." For example, in Brooks v. 
United States, 59 a serviceman on leave, off base, and in a private 
car was killed in a collision with an army truck. Since the acci-
dent was not incident to military service, tort recovery was avail-
55. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(l) (1978). 
56. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(3) (1978). 
57. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(5) (1978). The regulations in full regarding the types of dis-
charge that bar payment of benefits are as follows: 
(c) Benefits are not payable where the veteran was discharged or released 
under one of the following conditions: 
(1) As a conscientious objector who refused to perform military duty, wear the 
uniform, or comply with lawful order of competent military authorities, 
(2) By reason of the sentence of a general court-martial. 
(3) Resignation by an officer for the good of the service. 
(4) As a deserter. 
(5) As an alien during a period of hostilities, where it is affirmatively shown 
that the veteran requested his or her release. 
(d) A discharge or release because of one of the offenses specified in this 
paragraph is considered to have been issued under dishonorable conditions. 
(1) Acceptance of an undesirable discharge to escape trial by general court-
martial. 
(2) Mutiny or spying. 
(3) An offense involving moral turpitude. This includes, generally, conviction 
of a felony. 
(4) Willful and persistent misconduct. This includes a discharge under other 
than honorable conditions, if it is determined that it was issued because of willful 
and persistent misconduct. A discharge because of a minor offense will not, how-
ever, be considered willful and persistent misconduct if service was otherwise hon-
est, faithful and meritorious. 
(5) Generally, homosexual acts. 
38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c),(d) (1978). 
58. 431 U.S. at 673. 
59. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
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able, but veterans benefits were also recoverable because Brooks 
was in active duty status at the time.60 The Court declared: "We 
will not call either remedy in the present case exclusive, nor pro-
nounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not 
done so."61 It is hard to imagine that Congress intended the Veter-
ans' Benefits Act to be exclusive in some cases but not in others. 
If the purpose of veterans' benefits is, in fact, to provide an 
"upper limit" of government liability, as the court has inter-
preted it, then not only should it include an exclusivity provision, 
but the benefits afforded and the range of exclusivity should rea-
sonably be coterminous. 
Because the first two Feres pillars are not so sturdy as the 
Court's rhetoric might suggest, a modern Justice or Congressman 
eager to see that the intent of an earlier Congress is justly and 
accurately implemented would look closely at the remaining two 
pillars to see whether their worthwhile goals can be served by less 
extreme means than the Feres exception. In the next two Sec-
tions, this Note suggests that they can be served beautifully by 
the "discretionary function" exception that was written into the 
FTCA. 
ID. MILITARY AUTONOMY 
The most substantial pillar supporting Feres, one that was 
reasserted in Stencel, was the Court's deference to military au-
tonomy. The Court was reluctant to infringe upon the 
"distinctively federal" relationship between the government and 
the soldier by applying state tort law under the FTCA. As later 
cases have made clear, the "federal relationship" rationale really 
stood for the military's interest in carrying out its own discipline 
free from judicial interference. Since World War IT, however, 
courts have taken an increasingly active role in supervising the 
military, restricting the scope of military autonomy. They have 
been particularly active in limiting the scope of court-martial 
jurisdiction and in reviewing military administrative decisions. 
60. In contrast, in the context of workers' compensation or FECA, where compensa-
tion is limited to injuries having a causal or circumstantial connection with employment, 
Brooks' injury would not have been compensable. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE§ 3600 (Deering 
1976); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.301 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. Woruc. COMP. LAw 
§ 10 (McKinney 1965); 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). And where statutory compensation is 
available under either system, the tort remedy is consistently barred, thus maintaining 
consistent exclusivity. See note 46 supra; 5 U.S.C. § 116(e) (1976). 
61. 337 U.S. at 53. 
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Given that changing judicial attitude toward judicial autonomy, 
one must wonder why the Court still finds it persuasive in the 
context of tort claims. 
A. The "Federal Relationship" Rationale 
Justice Jackson stressed in Feres that the application of state 
tort law to a service-connected claim under the FTCA would 
violate the "distinctively federal" relationship between the sol-
dier and the government, a relationship defined and governed by 
federal law alone. 62 The cases following Feres have clarified and 
narrowed the concept so that "federal relationship" now connotes 
exclusive disciplinary authority over military personnel. 
Four years after Feres the Supreme Court again considered 
a serviceman's FTCA claim, in United States v. Brown.03 The 
plaintiff was a discharged veteran who had been injured in service 
and had received medical treatment and disability compensation 
from the government. Seven years after his discharge, he under-
went a further operation for his in-service injury at a Veterans' 
Administration facility and suffered a new injury. The Court held 
that this new injury was not incurred incidental to service within 
the meaning of Feres, since it "did not arise out of or in the course 
62. 340 U.S. at 143-44. Local law governs tort claims under the Fl'CA. See note 13 
supra. In characterizing the relationship as a "distinctively federal" one, Jackson relied 
on the earlier decision in United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947), a case which 
involved a soldier who had been struck by a privately owned truck while off base. The 
soldier signed a release, but the United States sued the owner and driver of the truck to 
recover for medical costs and wages expended during the soldier's disability. There was 
no statutory authorization for such a claim. The circuit court had considered the case to 
be governed by local tort law, in accord with the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938). 332 U.S. at 303-04 n.4. The Court refused to recognize the claim because, 
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinctively 
federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces. To 
whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or 
others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental 
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation be-
tween persons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from 
federal sources and governed by federal authority. 
332 U.S. at 305-06. 
Jackson suggested that the considerations present in Standard Oil "apply with even 
greater force" to Feres. 340 U.S. at 143. The two cases are, however, distinguishable 
because in Feres the FI'CA provided a statutory authorization for applicability of state 
law, which was lacking in Standard Oil. The Standard Oil rule was overturned by Act of 
Sept. 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-693, 76 Stat. 593 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1976)), 
which took effect in 1962, allowing the United States to recover for costs of medical care 
against a negligent private party. 
63. 348 U.S. 110 (1954) .. · 
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of military duty."64 The causal relationship was strong enough to 
justify an award of additional veteran's compensation, but not 
strong enough to fall within the Feres exemption from govern-
ment liability. 65 The Court identified the reasons for the Feres 
rule as disciplinary: 
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superi-
ors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline and 
the extreme results that .might obtain if suits under the Tort 
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent 
acts committed in the course of military duty.66 
The Court felt that since this claim was brought by a discharged 
veteran it implied no threat to military discipline, and therefore 
the Court allowed it. 67 
Shortly afterward, the Court considered the Feres doctrine's 
relevance to federal prisoners in United States u. Muniz. 68 The 
plaintiffs claimed to have been injured due to the negligence of 
federal prison employees. The district court dismissed the case as 
analogous to Feres, but the Supreme Court distinguished it, as-
serting that Feres "seems best explained" by the disciplinary 
concerns outlined in Brown. 69 The Court foresaw no significant 
discipline problem arising from application of the FTCA in fed-
eral prisons, noting that no such problems had arisen in states 
which allowed such suits. 7° 
Some hailed Muniz as a significant limitation of Feres11 and 
Stencel affirmed its redefinition of the "federal relationship" in 
terms of disciplinary authority and control of personnel. Chief 
Justice Burger emphasized in Stencel that "where the case con-
cerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on duty, the effect of 
the action upon military discipline" justifies barring an FTCA 
claim. Because the litigation would involve "second-guessing mil-
itary orders" and testimony by members of the armed services 
64. 348 U.S. at 113. 
65. "[T]he causal relation of the injury to the service was sufficient to bring the 
claim under the Veterans Act. But, unlike the claims in the Feres case, this one is not 
foreign to the broad patterns of liability which the United States undertook by the Tort 
Claims Act." 348 U.S. at 112. 
66. 348 U.S. at 112. 
67. 348 U.S. at 112. 
68. 374 U.S. 150 (1963). 
69. 374 U.S. at 162. See text at note 66 supra. 
70. 374 U.S. at 162-63. 
71. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 6, at 1286-87; Rhodes, supra note 6, at 29. Note, 
supra note 6, at 467. But see Mayo, Torts-Rights of Servicemen Under the FTCA, 45 
N.C. L. Rsv. 1129, 1134-35 (1967). 
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"as to each other's decisions and actions," he dismissed it. 72 In 
view of recent developments in the legal relationship between 
government and soldiers the "federal relationl(lhip" analysis is 
even weaker today than in 1950. The Stencel Court, however, 
failed to recognize the significance of these developments. The 
next two Parts show how the courts in recent years have reduced 
military autonomy in the treatment of personnel, allowing today 
only as much as is commensurate with military needs. Therefore, 
in upholding the Feres rule, the Stencel Court relied on an obso-
lete view of the powers of the military services and the rights of 
their personnel. 
B. Historical Evolution of Military Autonomy and Judicial 
Policy 
The Constitution says little about the legal status of the 
soldier. 73 Traditionally, the military services were viewed as an 
autonomous federal branch, a separate jurisdiction having its 
own rule oflaw, its own courts, and its own enforcement system.74 
72. 431 U.S. at 673. 
73. Congress is empowered to declare war, to raise and support armies, to maintain 
a navy, to make rules for the government of the armed forces, and to organize, equip, and 
train a militia. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. A separation of powers is achieved by making the 
President Commander-in-Chief. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Executive has the 
authority to make regulations for the armed forces. United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 291 (1842). Military personnel are subject to the authority of both Congress and the 
President. 
The fifth amendment excludes soldiers from the right to indictment by a grand jury 
in cases arising in actual service during war or public danger. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The 
application of this exclusion to the serviceman on duty at other times is not inherent, (See 
text at notes 94-98 infra.) It appears that the framers of the Constitution did not contem-
plate that the federal government would maintain a standing federal army in peacetime, 
but rather that the states would maintain militia which Congress could call up for the 
purposes of U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal 
Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 545 n.18 (1974). 
74. The military is probably unique among our government bureaucracies in 
the degree of autonomy accorded it by the three constitutional branches of govern-
ment. Occupying a special place because the protection and very survival of the 
nation is ultimately in its hands, it has generally been treated with considerable 
deference by Congress in its appropriating and regulating role and by the executive 
in its general supervisory role. Viewed as a society necessarily set apart because of 
its combat mission and its peculiar needs for discipline and obedience, it has been 
exempted from ordinary standards of judicial review by the courts. . • 
Sherman, supra note 73, at 540-41 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court emphasized 
the separateness of the military justice system in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 
(1953): "Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart 
from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. This Court has played 
no role in its development." 346 U.S. at 140 (footnotes omitted). See also Barker, Military 
Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 223 (1967), 
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Each of the services developed and enforced an independent sys-
tem of military law.75 
Until recently, courts regularly deferred to the military in 
administrative and criminal matters. According to one federal 
circuit court, the leading considerations inhibiting review of mili-
tary decisions were an unwillingness to second-guess judgments 
requiring military expertise, a reluctance to interfere with mili-
tary discretion, a fear of the flood of litigation that might ensue 
if judicial review were made available, and a concern that review 
might hamper vital military functions. 76 
Cracks appeared in the jurisprudential and administrative 
superstructure of the armed services during World War II.77 Con-
gress met demands for reform 78 by enacting the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ),79 which took effect in 1951. The UCMJ 
codified a unified body of criminal and disciplinary law for all the 
armed services.80 It was a vital step forward in defining the rights 
and duties of military personnel, but during the three decades 
since its enactment, pressures for reform have persisted. 
The courts responded to pressures for protection of soldiers' 
legal rights with a series of decisions making significant inroads 
on military autonomy. They have evolved new standards of mili-
tary autonomy in relation to personnel primarily in cases involv-
ing the scope of court martial jurisdiction and the authority of 
military administrative decisions. The policies evolved in these 
cases are incompatible with the Feres rationale. 
75. For a capsule history or' the military justice systems of the several military ser-
vices, see H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY§§ 1-111 to -116 (1972). 
76. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971). The Stencel majority was 
strongly influenced by what it imagined to be the probable "effects of the maintenance 
of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the 
Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in 
the course of military duty." United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954), quoted in 
Stencel Aero Engr. Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977). A trial, it was 
feared, "would ... involve second-guessing military orders, and would often require 
members of the armed services to testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions. 
This factor, too, weighs against permitting any recovery by petitioner against the United 
States." 431 U.S. at 673. 
77. See Holtzoff, Administration of Justice in the United States Army, 22 N.Y.U. 
L.Q. REV. 1 (1947), for a summary of inadequacies and injustices revealed by studies of 
military justice which were conducted following World War II in response to widespread 
criticism. 
78. See ESTABLISHING A UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, COMM. ON ARMED SERV-
ICES, S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1949). 
79. 10 u.s.c. §§ 801-940 (1976). 
80. See S. REP. No. 486, supra note 78, at 4. 
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1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction 
In its original wording, the UCMJ asserted jurisdiction ac-
cording to the status of the accused.81 Jurisdiction reached not 
only all military personnel on active duty82 but also some civilian 
groups such as dependents overseas, 83 discharged personnel, 84 and 
prisoners in the custody of the armed forces. 85 
In two landmark decisions, the United States Supreme Court 
sharply curtailed UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians. In Reid v. 
Covert, 86 it overturned court-martial jurisdiction of civilian de-
pendents overseas as an unconstitutional deprivation of Bill of 
Rights protections.87 The Court said that military law is essen-
tially disciplinary,88 so different from the law administered in 
article III courts that "the jurisdiction of military tribunals is a 
very limited and extraordinary jurisdiction. "89 
81. Persons subject to the Code are identified in 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1976), 
82. 10 u.s.c. § 802(1) (1976). 
83. 10 u.s.c. § 802(10)-(12) (1976). 
84. 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976) (jurisdiction over ex-servicemen who are accused of 
serious offenses committed while on duty and not triable in a civilian court). 
85. 10 U.S.C. § 802(7) (1976) (jurisdiction over prisoners in custody of the armed 
forces, serving sentences imposed by court martial). 
86. 354 U.S. 1 (1956). 
87. The Court stated: 
Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial 
and of other treasured constitutional protections. Having run up against the stead-
fast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper clause cannot extend 
the scope of Clause 14 [of U.S. Const. art. I, § 8]. 
354 U.S. at 21. 
88. The Court described military law as a harsh law which emphasizes discipline 
more than justice, and "the security and order of the group rather than • • • the value 
and integrity of the individual." 354 U.S. at 39-40. Military authorities readily acknowl-
edge the fusion of justice and discipline in military law: "The ultimate purpose of military 
justice is to maintain military discipline and thereby strengthen national security." 
U.S.A.F. REs. OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS, THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (1962) (italics 
omitted), quoted in H. MOYER, supra note 75, § 1-150. Similarly, naval personnel are 
informed that "[n]aval justice is the disciplinary and court-martial system of the Navy. 
Its purpose is the maintenance of naval discipline, without which the Navy cannot func-
tion as an efficient fighting organization." Naval Justice, Nav. Pers. 16199 (Oct,, 1945) 
(published and distributed by Standards and Curriculum Division, Training, Bureau of 
Naval Personnel), quoted in H. MOYER, supra note 75, § 1-150. 
Recently, General William Westmoreland identified the primary purpose of the mili-
tary justice system as follows: "First and foremost, the military justice system should 
deter conduct which is prejudicial to good order and discipline. . •. Discipline markedly 
differentiates the soldier from his counterpart in civilian society. Unlike the order that is 
sought in civilian society, military discipline is absolutely essential in the Armed Forces," 
Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's Viewpoint, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV, 5, 5 
(1971). 
89. 354 U.S. at 21. 
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In Toth v. Quarles, 90 which soon followed, the Supreme Court 
struck down court-martial jurisdiction over discharged personnel 
accused of serious crimes committed while on duty. 91 The Court 
held court martial jurisdiction legitimate only where it is ':the 
least possible power adequate to the end proposed. " 92 Where the 
defendant has been discharged from service, the military's need 
to impose discipline is insufficient to justify the encroachment on 
article III jurisdiction and the abridgment of individual rights 
that military jurisdiction entails. 93 , 
The Court similarly cut back UCMJ jurisdiction over all 
active duty personnel94 in O'Callahan v. Parker. 95 There, the 
Court held that if the alleged crime of an active duty member of 
the armed forces is not "service-connected," no military necessity 
exists to justify military jurisdiction. 96 Again, the Court restricted 
military necessity to "the exigencies of military discipline."97 
Thus, military law in peacetime is now only constitutionally 
applicable to those subject to military discipline, and then only 
if a crime is service-connected. Article III jurisdiction does not 
yield to military jurisdiction except where the alleged crime has 
a clear impact on the discipline and morale of the armed forces. 98 
Military jurisdiction is appropriate only to meet "military neces-
sity"; the essence of military necessity is discipline.99 
90. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
91. The petitioner, Toth, had been arrested by military authorities five months after 
his honorable discharge from the Army, ana was tried by a military tribunal on charges 
of murder committed while he was on active duty abroad. Toth's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was granted by the Supreme Court on certiorari. 350 U.S. at 23. 
92. 350 U.S. at 23 (footnote and italics omitted). 
93. "[C]onsiderations of discipline provide no excuse for new expansion of court-
martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system 
of trial by jury." 350 U.S. at 22-23. 
94. 10 u.s.c. § 802(1) (1976). 
95. 395 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1969). 
96. 395 U.S. at 272. 
97. 395 U.S. at 261. 
98. The O'Callahan rule was further developed in Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 
355 (1971), where it was decided that a soldier's crime against a person or property on base 
is "service-connected." The Court listed the factors stressed in O'Callahan as making that 
crime non-service-connected, including the lack of military control of the situs of the crime 
and lack of connection between the crime and the serviceman's duties, the fact that the 
crime took place within the United States in peacetime, the fact that the crime was one 
traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts and that a civilian, court was available for 
prosecution of the case, and the absence of any flouting of military authority. 401 U.S. at 
365. 
99. A recent student comment finds a "doctrine of military necessity" employed by 
both military and civil courts to determine the reach of the Bill of Rights into the military 
context: 
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2. Military Administrative Decisions 
The Court has also reduced the autonomy of military admin-
istrative bodies. But in this area the emphasis has been on mili-
tary "discretion" rather than on discipline. In the leading case of 
Harmon v. Brucker, 100 two soldiers challenged their less-than-
honorable discharges, which were issued for their conduct prior 
to induction. Unlike cases challenging UCMJ jurisdiction, 
Harmon held that a soldier need not assert the constitu-
tional right to due process in order to obtain review of a military 
administrative decision.101 Instead, he may prevail by showing 
that the decision maker has exceeded his statutory powers, for 
then "his actions would not constitute exercises of his administra-
tive discretion, and . . . judicial relief from this illegality would 
be available."102 A flood of federal circuit court decisions after 
Harmon granted relief from a wide range of military administra-
tive decisions. 103 
In Mindes v. Seaman104 the Fifth Circuit reviewed the devel-
Historically, military personnel have not been accorded constitutional protections 
to the same degree as their civilian counterparts . . . . Their rights in disciplinary 
matters are protected by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and by 
judicial review in the Court of Military Appeals (COMA), and in the federal courts. 
COMA and the lower federal courts have developed the military necessity doctrine 
as a means of assessing the degree to which a particular constitutional guarantee 
applies to service personnel. 
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 215, 215 n. 4 (1975) (citations omitted). 
100. 355 U.S. 579 (1958). 
101. 355 U.S. at 581. 
102. 355 U.S. at 582. Despite legislation providing internal Army mechanisms for 
final and conclusive disposition of contested discharges, it was held that the district court 
did have jurisdiction to determine that the Secretary of the Army had exceeded his 
statutory powers in issuing the discharges or to overturn his action. 
103. In Clark v. Brown, 414 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court struck down an Air 
Force refusal to reassign reservists to standby reserve status when according to regulations 
they had completed the requisite period of military service. The Second Circuit court in 
Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970), issued a writ of mandamus to compel 
proper consideration of a draftee's application for hardship discharge as prescribed by 
regulation, distinguishing the judicial power to review a discretionary military decision, 
which is "extraordinarily limited," from the power to review a decision taken where the 
military fails to follow its own regulations, an error which "we do not hesitate to rectify." 
426 F.2d at 427. Two other circuit courts issued writs of mandamus requiring military 
departments to permit reservists called up for active duty to use the internal review 
procedures of which they had been deprived in violation of military regulations. Schatten 
v. United States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); 
There also have been a number of successful challenges to administrative discharges on a 
similar basis, e.g., Kennedy v. Secretary of the Navy, 401 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir.1968); Bland 
v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961); 
Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
104. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). Mindes, an Air Force Captain, sought to void a 
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opments of the 1960s in this area and formulated some basic rules 
for judicial review of internal military affairs. First, the complain-
ant must allege either-a violation of applicable statutes or regula-
tions or a deprivation of a constitutional right and he must have 
exhausted his military administrative remedies. Second, a court 
must evaluate the nature and strength of the complainant's chal-
lenge, 105 the potential injury to complainant if review is denied, 1116 
the potential interference with the military function if review is 
granted, 107 and the extent to which the challenged action involves 
military expertise or discretion. 108 
Mindes demonstrated that even where a constitutional viola-
tion is not alleged, the courts now actively define the boundaries 
of military autonomy. That definition included not only interpre-
tation of applicable statutes and regulations but also evaluation 
of the need for military expertise of judgment in a given situation, 
as well as the potential effects of judicial review on the "military 
function." Thus, just as the courts reduce.cl military disciplinary 
power to the bounds of military necessity, they have similarly 
redefined the limits of military discretion. In light of those devel-
opments, the reliance of Feres on deference to "military auton-
omy" must be reconsidered. 
C. The New Judicial Stance and Feres 
The new judicial attitude toward military autonomy is in-
consistent with the "federal relationship" between soldier and 
government envisioned in Feres. The issues of military autonomy 
that tort recovery raises are the same issues that the Court faced 
in the court martial jurisdiction and administrative review cases. 
factually erroneous and adverse Officer Effectiveness Report that led to his removal from 
active duty. After exhausting administrative options, he filed a complaint seeking injunc-
tive relief in a district court. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction; the Fifth 
Circuit remanded for review of the case on its merits. 
105. 453 F.2d at 201. The court elaborated, "Constitutional claims, normally more 
important than those having only a statutory or regulatory base, are themselves unequal 
in the whole scale of values-compare haircut regulation questions to those arising in 
court-martial situations which raise issues of personal liberty." 
106. 453 F.2d at 201. 
107. 453 F.2d at 201. According to the court, this is a question of degree: "Interference 
per se is insufficient since there will always be some interference when review is granted, 
but if the interference would be such as to seriously .impede the military in the perform-
ance of vital duties, it militates strongly against relief." 
108. 453 F.2d at 201-02. "Courts should defer to the superior knowledge and experi-
ence of professionals in matters such as promotions or orders directly related to specific 
military functions." 
1118 Michigan Law Review LVol. 77:1099 
There is a need for protecting military discipline, particularly 
where a command or order may be challenged. There is a need 
for unhampered exercise of military expertise and discretion in 
carrying out the military function. And there is a military need 
for freedom to employ uniform standards of care throughout far-
flung military operations.109 
. Yet we have seen that these issues no longer completely bar 
judicial review. Moreover, the FTCA itself permits the courts to 
evaluate the military interests and to defer to military autonomy 
where necessary. Section 2680(a) of the Act110 clearly orders the 
courts to determine whether the alleged tortious act was a discre-
tionary action. If so, it would not be susceptible to challenge and 
judicial evaluation. Using the standards proposed in Section V of 
this Note, courts may use this "discretionary function" exception 
together with other specific exceptions in the Act, 111 to protect 
military autonomy in tort claims every bit as securely as it is 
protected by the rules of court martial jurisdiction and review of 
administrative decisions. 
IV. THE UNIFORMITY PROBLEM 
Closely related to the problem of military autonomy is the 
need for nationwide uniformity in the conduct of military activi-
ties, the fourth pillar of the Feres doctrine. The Court envisioned 
the armed forces as a nationwide enterprise in which each activity 
must be conducted under a single set of regulations and a single 
standard of care.112 Under the FTCA, however, liability depends 
upon the laws of the place where the act or omission occurred. 113 
The Court has been concerned that the application of varying 
standards of care would hinder the vital function of national secu-
rity.114 But that vital function, like the more general policies be-
hind "military autonomy," is protected by the "discretionary 
function" exception of the FTCA. 
Feres stressed the unfairness of exposing military personnel 
to varying conditions of danger that reflect local standards of 
109. On the significance of the need for uniformity see text at notes 112-27 infra. 
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1976). 
111. The FTCA ext:ludes claims arising in foreign countries, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) 
(1976), from combatant activities, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1976), and from intentional torts 
of government employees, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). 
112. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Engr. Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977), 
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). 
114. It is only in domestic operations that the FTCA would entail such difficulties, 
due to its express exclusion of overseas claims. See note 111 supra. 
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care. 115 Later cases, however, have tended not to support this part 
of the Feres rationale. In Feres, Justice Jackson noted that while 
the FTCA requirement of "the law of the place" might be fair to 
a civilian, who is free in his choice of habitat, it makes no sense 
to apply it to a soldier, who has no such choice.116 Yet, as United 
States v. Muniz 117 pointed out in a similar context, denial of any 
tort recovery is far more prejudicial to a plaintiff than mere appli-
cation of nonuniform state laws.118 Moreover, the sheer number 
of FTCA suits brought by military personnel since·Feres, despite 
the small likelihood of success, demonstrates the willingness of 
military plaintiffs to have their claims adjudicated according to 
diverse state laws.119 The Feres Court's solicitude for the military 
plaintiff seems ill-placed. The Stencel Court apparently appre-
ciated the weakness of the uniformity pillar and shifted perspec-
tive. While purporting to rely on the concern of the Feres Court 
for military uniformity it in fact looked at the issue from the 
perspective of the government defendant: The Court said that 
since the military performs a "unique, nationwide function," 
115. 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950). 
116. 340 U.S. at 143. 
117. 374 U.S. 150 (1963). 
118. 374 U.S. at 162. 
119. For example, of the cases reported during the years 1976-1978 where tort dam-
ages were sought against the United States for injuries to servicemen, two distinguished 
Feres, Fischer v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (claim by former Air 
Force cadet for injuries· caused by malpractice of Air Force football team physician not 
barred by Feres because the injury was not incident to military service); Milliken v. 
United States, 439 F. Supp. 290 (D. Kan. 1976) (serviceman not barred from action under 
FTCA for alleged beatings by military law enforcement officers while confined by military 
service); whereas in nine such cases (including Stencel) Feres was followed, Daberkow v. 
United States, 581 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1978) (dependents of West German serviceman killed 
in United States during joint German-American military activity barred from recovery 
against the United States by Feres); Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(naval officer injured in traffic collision on naval base while relieved from routine duties 
and engaged in personal business barred from recovery); Camassar v. United States, 531 
F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1976)(serviceman on leave, delivering' personal possessions to his ship, 
killed when private vehicle he was riding drove off pier; estate barred from recovery for 
wrongful death); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978)(claim by Na-
tional Guard officer barred where he alleged malpractice by army medical officers treating 
him while on duty); Welch v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 75 (D. Conn. 1978) (Peres 
rationale bars claim under Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1976) where ser-
viceman was struck by military vehicle on naval base abroad); Parker v. United States, 
437 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (serviceman on weekend pass killed in traffic collision 
on base; claim barred); Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1976) 
(claims based on medical malpractice occurring in serviceman's discharge examinations 
barred); Garvas v. Clark Equip. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (third-party 
action against United States by manufacturer of tractor driven by reservist during annual 
training, alleging failure to maintain and to instruct plaintiffs in its use, barred under 
Feres). 
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which requires that it "frequently move large numbers of men, 
and large quantities of equipment, from one end of the continent 
to the other, and beyond," it therefore "makes no sense to permit 
the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the 
liability of the Government to a serviceman who sustains service-
connected injuries."120 
But that version of the uniformity argument has its own 
weaknesses. As Justice Marshall, dissenting in Stencel, pointed 
out, it is illogical to immunize only the military from local law 
and not other government agencies or departments that perform 
a "unique, nationwide function" of similar scope and complex-
ity .121 The FTCA should have appeared to be a threat to the 
operation of all government agencies that carry on complex na-
tionwide activities. 
Moreover, it is important to recognize the extent to which 
local tort law already governs the armed services in spite of the 
Feres rule. The armed forces are subject to diverse standards of 
care and liability wherever they are in contact with civilians who 
are not government employees, including dependents living on 
base within the United States, and civilians visiting bases or 
using military facilities. Indeed, wherever a domestic public car-
rier transports military personnel, whenever private land sur-
rounds a military testing site, and whenever civilians feel the 
effects of domestic military operations in any way, the govern-
ment faces potential FTCA liability. In fact, few domestic mili-
tary activities are not subject to local standards of care. 
For example, the courts have held military physicians and 
other military hospital employees to local professional standards 
of care where the patient was a civilian dependent.122 And a civil-
ian plaintiff was able to hold a military hospital to a local stan-
dard of responsibility for a military patient. 123 Therefore, to bar 
suits by service personnel does not actually protect the military 
hospitals from diverse state laws of medical malpractice nor en-
120. 431 U.S. at 672. 
121. 431 U.S. at 657. 
122. E.g., in Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950), and Denny v. 
United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948), the decision to admit a civilian dependent to 
a military medical facility for treatment was held to be "discretionary," but once the 
patient was admitted, the hospital was subject to liability under the ITCA. 
123. E.g., in Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966), and Fair v. 
United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956), it was held that when the negligent release of 
a member of the armed forces from a military hospital causes injury to a civilian, the 
civilian may sue the government under the ITCA for malpractice by the hospital employ-
ees. 
April 1979] Note-From Feres to Stencel 1121 
sure nationwide uniformity of liability standards for military 
medical facilities. Similarly, local standards have been applied to 
such military concerns as specifications for the manufacture of 
aircraft, 124 procedures for an Air Force flight training program, 125 
specifications for reactivation of of an Air Force base, 126 and the 
traffic control system on a military base. 127 
Uniformity, therefore, is not as solid a pillar as Feres and 
Stencel suggest. Military plaintiffs are willing to have their 
claims tried under local law and, in practice, local law already 
applies to military activities. Since the military must already 
cope with varying state standards of care, extending the FTCA 
to serviceman's claims will not create a novel burden on the 
armed forces. Where uniformity is necessary for military rea-
sons-where it really is necessary to "the nationwide function of 
protecting national security" -the FTCA's exception for discre-
tionary activities will, applied with the standards developed in 
the next section, protect that value. 
V. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
The FTCA excludes government liability for claims growing 
out of "discretionary" activities by the government and its em-
ployees. This exception could be the key to justly and equitably 
applying the FTCA to military claims, for it would bar claims 
growing out of certain policy, planning, regulatory, or disciplinary 
decisions of the armed forces and preserve the unique military 
interests that are thought to underlie the Feres rule. In particular, 
the exception encompasses the special concern of military auton-
omy and uniformity. But the exception would allow claims for 
activities that are merely operational and that do not jeopardize 
vital military interests. The exclusion extends to: 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or 
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused.128 
124. Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973); Swanson v. 
United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964). 
125. United Air Lines Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 
U.S. 951 (1964). 
126. United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962). 
, 127. Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1975). 
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). 
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According to congressional reports, this was 
a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possibility 
that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages 
against the Government growing out of an authorized activity, 
such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no negligence on 
the part of any Government agent is shown and the only ground 
for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a·private indi-
vidual would be tortious, or that the statute or regulation authoriz-
ing the project was invalid. It is also designed to preclude applica-
tion of the bill to a claim against a regulatory agency, such as the 
Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, based upon an alleged abuse of discretionary authority by 
an officer or employee, whether or not negligence is alleged to have 
been involved. . . . Nor is it desirable or intended that the consti-
tutionality of legislation, or the legality of a rule or regulation 
should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort. 120 
The courts have construed the discretionary exception to 
protect governmental "planning" activities, in contradistinction 
to those that are merely "operational."130 The planning or discre-
tionary function has further been construed to include any deci-
sion that coritains a significant element of policy making131-
evaluation of factors such as financial feasibility, need, safety, 
and time restrictions on a project or plan.132 Thus, the exception 
129. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946). 
130. Construction of the ITCA's discretionary exception in terms of a distinction 
between "planning" and "operational" functions originated in Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite the Court held that the discretionary exception was applic-
able to bar claims for damages arising from the explosion of a shipload of fertilizer manu-
factured pursuant to a War Department project for export of fertilizer to devastated 
countries following World War II, because the alleged negligence took place "at a planning 
rather than operational level." 346 U.S. at 32. 
Although the Dalehite case has since been significantly limited, see Indian Towing 
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 62-65 (1955), subsequent cases have followed the 
planning-operational rationale. E.g., United Air Lines Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (the Air Force had discretion to set up a training 
program, but not to disregard commercial flight patterns in routing the training flights); 
United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962) (plans for reactivating an Air 
Force base were discretionary, but negligent design of the drainage and sewage facilities 
for the base was .not); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956) (the 
decision to fly low-level survey flights was discretionary, but the failure to use due care 
in the flight was not); Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (the 
decision to design an elevator mechanism for military aircraft was discretionary, but the 
failure to properly supervise an inexperienced engineer assigned to the project was not). 
131. In Dalehite, the Court reasoned that the i, 'discretionary function or duty' • • • 
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or sched-
ules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discre-
tion." 346 U.S. at 35-36. (footnote omitted). 
132. Policy considerations mentioned by the courts as making a decision 
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would not permit military claimants to question central deci-
sions that set general standards for local operations or for proj-
ects to be carried out on the local level according to a central plan. 
"Planning activities" would also include all regulations and 
directives issued by the various armed services within their dis-
cretionary powers, as well as congressional statutes affecting mili-
tary activities.133 Vulnerability to tort suit under the FTCA would 
only arise at the "operational" level. 
The courts will have to define which military activities are 
"operational." They can, of course, turn to the large body of law 
already developed under the exception. Some special standards, 
however, will be necessary to test the discretionary nature of mili-
tary actions and decisions to protect legitimate areas of military 
autonomy. For each claim, courts will have to study the relation 
between the cause of the injury or loss and special areas of mili-
tary power and needs, rather than relying on the military/civilian 
status of the plaintiff. The following four tests are suggested to 
achieve this goal. 
1. Did the injury arise due to a decision or action requiring 
professional military expertise or judgment? 
In summarizing the judicial policy regarding military admin-
istrative decisions, 134 the court in Mindes v. Seaman135 conceded 
that "Courts should defer to the superior knowledge and experi-
ence of professionals in matters such as . . . orders directly re-
lated to specific military functions. " 136 That policy is ·consistent 
"discretionary" are most often cost or "feasibility," safety, need, probable benefit, and 
time restrictions. See, e.g., J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97, 99 
(5th Cir. 1975); Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1256 
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98, 105 n.16 (9th Cir. 1962); United 
States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1955); Stanley v. United States, 347 F. Supp. 
1088, 1096 (D. Me. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 476 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1973); Swanson 
v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Bulloch v. United States, 133 
F. Supp. 885, 888 (D. Utah 1955). 
133. E.g., where an Air Force training plane crashed with a commercial airliner, 
negligence by the air base command in establishing the training procedure was alleged. 
The court held that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the com-
mand had failed to follow the Air Force regulations covering such procedures. If the 
regulations had been followed, the court implied, the discretionary function exception 
would apply. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). See also Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 
1948); Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950). 
134. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). 
135. See text at notes 104-09 supra. 
136. 453 F.2d at 201-02. 
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with the judicial interpretation of the FTCA whenever civilians 
sue the government for actions by civilian or military personnel. 
Government employees are immune to tort liability to civilians 
if their actions require professional expertise or judgment. 137 The 
test is thus a simple extension of an existing rule to a new class 
of plaintiffs. It may, for example, be within the discretion of an 
officer to employ potentially dangerous training methods. In con-
trast, the maintenance of the heating system of the barrack where 
Feres died was not a matter of professional military judgment and 
would fall within the category of "operational" acts. 
2. Are there significant disciplinary reasons to bar the claim? 
The enforcement of military discipline is an essential aspect_ 
of military discretion, as the Feres doctrine recognizes. 138 Thus, 
where a tort claim would bring into question matters of military 
discipline,· the "discretionary action" exception should bar the 
claim. The inquiry should be: Did the tortfeasor have authority 
over the claimant, and if so, was the tortfeasor actjng within his 
authority?139 Was the claimant carrying out a military decision 
or command from which the injury arose? Discipline should be 
considered an element of military discretion only to the extent 
137. In the development of the "planning" versus "operational" test for the discre-
tionary exception, see note 130 supra, courts have included under the "planning" rubric 
decisions requiring professional "evaluations of factors such as the financial, political, 
economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy." Swanson v. United States, 229 F. 
Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal.1964). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Coates 
v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v. Ure, 347 F. Supp. 1088 
(D. Me. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 476 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1973). In contrast, where 
the action that gave rise to injury was merely the carrying out of a decision made at a 
higher or professional level, the exception does not apply. E.g., American Exch. Bank v. 
United States, 257-F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958); Jemison v. The Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. 
Ala. 1958). 
138. See text at notes 66 & 69 supra. 
139. In applying the ''discretionary function or duty" exception of the FTCA, 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), the courts have emphasized the importance of a government 
agency's or employee's mandate for the exercise of discretion. E.g., agencies mandated to 
approve state-planned and state-constructed highways under the Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374, were required to follow a set of federal guidelines but 
empowered to exercise discretion in their application of the guidelines. Daniel v. United 
States, 426 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1970); Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962). Similarly, statutory authorization for weathermen in Mid-
Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1953), affd. sub. nom. 
National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 
(1954), to use discretion in issuing reports, and for the military hospital in Denny v. United 
States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1948), to admit patients if treatment was "practicable," was 
determinative in applying the § 2680(a) exception. 
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that it affects the circumstances in which the injury arose. 140 The 
Stencel Court's fear that tort suits will cause disciplinary prob-
lems is not a sufficient basis to bar a claim. Due to recent narrow-
ing of military autonomy, courts already hear challenges to mili-
tary actions by service personnel. Barring suits challenging mili-
tary commands and decisions requiring military expertise or 
judgment would eliminate the most potentially disruptive suits. 
Courts would not be "second-guessing military orders." 
3. Is there a statute or military regulation that prescribes a 
standard of conduct? 
Both the propagation and the enforcement of regulations and 
directives are parts of military discretion, 141 and lack of power to 
set uniform standards would indeed hinder military operations. 
Thus in an FTCA suit by a military claimant, military regula-
tions and federal statutes should preempt local law. An action so 
authorized should be deemed "discretionary."142 
4. Did the injury arise due to an emergency that would justify 
a lower standard of care? 
When the armed forces respond to national emergencies not 
involving combat, 143 time and resources may be inadequate to 
prepare or equip personnel fully. In applying the FTCA, courts 
should consider this aspect of military necessity in determining 
whether the discretionary action exception should apply. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under the Feres rule, courts determine availability of the tort 
140. In Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252, 256 (C.D. Cal. 1966), it was suggested 
that the test for exclusion of military personnel from recourse to the ITCA should be 
"whether or not the injuries stemmed from activities that involved an official military 
relationship between the negligent person and the claimant." However, the appellate 
court did not accept this reasoning: it reversed on the basis of Peres. United States v. Lee, 
400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968). 
141. Regulations, directives, and instructions governing military conduct, issued by 
the Department of Defense, carry the presidential authority as well as the congressional 
mandate, 10 U.S.C. § 133 (1976). The regulating authority is also delegated, subject to 
superior authority, to the head of each military department, who may issue departmental 
regulations, and to commanding officers. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976); 10 U.S.C. § 280 (1976). 
142. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946), quoted in text at note 
129 supra. The role of regulations outlined here is the same as that applied ·in FTCA suits 
by civilian claimants. See note 133 supra. 
143. Claims arising from combat in time of war by the armed forces are excluded from 
the ITCA waiver of immunity, under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1976). 
1126 Michigan Law Review LVol. 77:1099 
remedy on the basis of the status and circumstances of the plain-
tiff at the time of the injury. No regard is given to the soldier's 
relation to the tortfeasor, to the nexus between the soldier's spe-
cific military function and the injury, or to any military reasons 
for the tort. The soldier is deprived of the civilian's recourse to 
the FTCA in practically any contact he may have with a govern-
ment agent or instrumentality while on duty, on base, or on his 
way to or from his place of duty. 144 Feres represents the only 
judicially created exception to the FTCA. It finds support neither 
in the language of the Act nor in its legislative history. In justify-
ing this exception, the Court has relied on the statutory compen-
sation already provided to members of the armed forces. But that 
argument fails to recognize the uncertainty of statutory compen-
sation. It also fails to provide a rational basis for the courts to 
declare compensation exclusive in one case and not in another. 
The. Feres rule attempts to prevent tort claims that might 
threaten either the general autonomy of the armed services or the 
uniformity of military standards of conduct. But Feres rests on 
an obsolete view of the role and powers of the military services. 
Since it was decided, the judiciary has evaluated military issues 
with growing confidence and without the predicted disruption of 
military order. Courts have been increasingly active in protecting 
members of the military services from abuses of power by their 
superiors. Special military needs still exist but proper application 
of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA to claims by 
military personnel will protect those interests. 
Feres has placed an undesirable and inequitable disability 
upon members of the armed services. That burden is inconsistent 
with modern law and policy regarding the l~gal status of military 
personnel. A soldier is ready to risk life and limb where national 
survival is at·stake, but there is no justification for requiring him 
to bear the risk of operational negligence in domestic, non-
combat circumstances, where the potential loss to him is great 
and the risk to military interests minimal. The time has come for 
the Court or Congress to abolish the Feres rule. 
144. E.g., Hale v. United States, 452 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1971) (hitch-hiking service-
man on way to base, injured while boarding a military vehicle, barred from FTCA suit); 
Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1961) (action for wrongful death barred for 
Air Force sergeants en route to special service school, struck by car of United States Navy 
recruiting officer); Adams v. United States, Civil Action No. 1032 (M.D. Ga., June 2, 
1965), cited in Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (service-
man injured while on pass, on base, barred from FTCA recovery). 
